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Abstract
There is a variety of ways to reason with normative systems. This partly reflects a
variety of semantics developed for deontic logic, such as traditional semantics based on
possible worlds, or alternative semantics based on algebraic methods, explicit norms or
techniques from non-monotonic logic. This diversity raises the question how these rea-
soning methods are related, and which reasoning method should be chosen for a partic-
ular application. In this paper we discuss the use of examples, inference patterns, and
more abstract properties. First, benchmark examples can be used to compare ways to
reason with normative systems. We give an overview of several benchmark examples
of normative reasoning and deontic logic: van Fraassen’s paradox, Forrester’s paradox,
Prakken and Sergot’s cottage regulations, Jeffrey’s disarmament example, Chisholm’s
paradox, Makinson’s Möbius strip, and Horty’s priority examples. Moreover, we dis-
tinguish various interpretations that can be given to these benchmark examples, such
as consistent interpretations, dilemma interpretations, and violability interpretations.
Second, inference patterns can be used to compare different ways to reason with nor-
mative systems. Instead of analysing the benchmark examples semantically, as it is
usually done, in this paper we use inference patterns to analyse them at a higher level of
abstraction. We discuss inference patterns reflecting typical logical properties such as
strengthening of the antecedent or weakening of the consequent. Third, more abstract
properties can be defined to compare different ways to reason with normative systems.
To define these more abstract properties, we first present a formal framework around
the notion of detachment. Some of the ten properties we introduce are derived from the
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for valuable comments. This work is supported by the European Union’s
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Curie grant agreement No: 690974 (Mining
and Reasoning with Legal Texts, MIREL).
Vol. 4 No. 9 2017
IFCoLog Journal of Logic and its Applications
PARENT AND VAN DER TORRE
inference patterns, but others are more abstract: factual detachment, violation detec-
tion, substitution, replacements of equivalents, implication, para-consistency, conjunc-
tion, factual monotony, norm monotony, and norm induction. We consider these ten
properties as desirable for a reasoning method for normative systems, and thus they
can be used also as requirements for the further development of formal methods for
normative systems and deontic logic.
Keywords: Deontic Logic, Normative Systems, Benchmarks, Inference Patterns, Framework,
Properties
1 Introduction
The Handbook of Deontic Logic and Normative Systems [5] describes a debate between the
traditional or standard semantics for deontic logic and alternative approaches. The tradi-
tional semantics is based on possible world models, whereas many alternative approaches
refer to foundations in normative systems, algebraic methods, or non-monotonic logic. In
particular, whereas Anderson [1] argued to refer explicitly to normative systems and also
Åqvist [2] builds on it, various alternative approaches such as input/output logic [13, 14]
represent norms explicitly in the semantics.
Proponents of alternative approaches typically refer to limitations in the traditional ap-
proach, although the traditional approach has been generalised or extended to handle many
of these limitations [10]. The development of formal and conceptual bridges between tra-
ditional and alternative approaches is one of the main current challenges in the area of
normative systems and deontic logic. The following three limitations are frequently dis-
cussed.
Dilemmas. Examples discussed in the literature are those of van Fraassen [30], Makinson
[13]’s Möbius strip, Prakken and Sergot [20]’s cottage regulations, and Horty [9]’s
priority examples.
Defeasibility. The traditional approach does not distinguish various kinds of defeasibility.
Legal norms are often assumed to be defeasible, and there is an increasing interest in
philosophy in defeasibility, such as the defeasibility of moral reasons [9, 16].
Identity. Many traditional deontic logics validate the formula©(α|α), read as “α is oblig-
atory given α,” “whose intuitive standing is open to question” [13]. This has been
dismissed as a harmless borderline case by proponents of the traditional semantics,
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but it hinders the representation of fulfilled obligations and violations, playing a cen-
tral role in normative reasoning. Consider a logic validating identity: the formula
©(α|¬α), which represents explicitly that there is a violation, is not satisfiable; the
obligation of α disappears, in context ¬α. (See Section 2 in this paper.)
Different disciplines and applications have put forward different requirements for the
development of formal methods for normative systems and deontic logic. For example,
in linguistics compositionality is an important requirement, as deontic statements must be
integrated into a larger theory of language. In legal informatics, constitutive and permissive
norms play a central role, and legal norms may conflict. It is an open problem whether
there can be a unique formal method which can be widely applied across disciplines, or
even whether there is a single framework of formal methods which can be used. In this
sense, there may be an important distinction between classical and normative reasoning,
since there is a unique first order logic for classical logic reasoning about the real world
using sets, relations and functions. The situation for normative reasoning may be closer to
the situation for non-monotonic reasoning, where also a family of reasoning methods have
been proposed, rather than a unique method.
In this paper we do not want to take a stance on these discussions, but we want to
provide techniques and ideas to compare traditional and alternative approaches. We focus
on inference patterns and proof-theory instead of semantical considerations. In particular,
in this paper we are interested in the question:
Which obligations can be detached from a set of rules or conditional norms in
a context?
Our angle is different from the more traditional one in terms of inference rules.
There are many frameworks for reasoning about rules and norms, and there are many
examples about detachment from normative systems, many of them problematic in some
sense. However, there are few properties to compare and analyse ways to detach obligations
from rules and norms, and they are scattered over the literature. We are not aware of a
systematic overview of these properties. We address our research question by surveying
examples, inference patterns and properties from the deontic logic literature.
Examples: Van Fraassen’s paradox, Forrester’s paradox, Prakken and Sergot’s cottage reg-
ulations, Jeffrey’s disarmament example, Chisholm’s paradox, Makinson’s Möbius
strip, and Horty’s priority example. They illustrate challenges for normative reason-
ing with deontic dilemmas, contrary-to-duty reasoning, defeasible obligations, rea-
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soning by cases, deontic detachment, prioritised obligations, and combinations of
these.
Inference Patterns: Conjunction, weakening of the consequent, forbidden conflict, factual
detachment, strengthening of the antecedent, violation detection, compliance detec-
tion, reinstatement, deontic detachment, transitivity, and various variants of these
patterns.
Framework: We develop a framework for deontic logics representing and resolving con-
flicts. By framework we mean that we do not develop a single logic, but many of
them. This reflects that there is not a single logic of obligation and permission, but
many of them, and which one is to be used depends on the application.
Properties: Factual detachment, violation detection, substitution, replacements of equiva-
lents, implication, paraconsistency, conjunction, factual monotony, norm monotony,
and norm induction.
The term “property" is more general than the term “inference pattern". An inference
pattern describes a property of a certain form. The inference patterns listed above appear
also in the list properties. For instance, factual monotony echoes strengthening of the an-
tecedent. In some cases, we use the same name for both the inference pattern and the
corresponding property.
A formal framework to compare formal methods should make as little assumptions
as possible, so it is widely applicable. We only assume that the context is a set of facts
{a, b, . . .} and that the conditional norms are of the type “if a is the case, then it ought to
be the case that b” where a and b are sentences of a propositional language. This is more
general than some rule-based languages based on logic programming, where a is restricted
to a conjunction of literals and b is a single literal. However, it is less expressive than many
other languages, that contain, for example, modal or first order sentences, constitutive and
permissive norms, mixed norms such as “if a is permitted, then b is obligatory," nested op-
erators, time, actions, knowledge, and so on. There are few benchmark examples discussed
in the literature for such an extended language (see [6] for a noteworthy exception) and we
are not aware of any properties specific for such extended languages. Extending our formal
framework and properties to such extended languages is therefore left to further research.
Our framework is built upon the notion of detachment. In traditional approaches “if a,
then it ought that b” is typically written as either a → ©b or as©(b|a), and in alternative
approaches it is sometimes written as (a, b). To be able to compare the different reasoning
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methods, we will not distinguish between these ways to represent normative systems. The
challenge for comparing the formal approaches is that traditional methods typically derive
conditional obligations, whereas alternative methods typically do not, maybe because they
assume norms do not have truth values and thus they cannot be derived from other norms.
Instead, they derive only unconditional obligations. To compare these approaches, one may
assume that the derivation of a conditional obligation “if a, then it ought that b” is short
for “if the context is exactly {a}, then the obligation ©b is detached.” Alternatively, the
detachment of an obligation for b in context a in alternative systems may be written as the
derivation of a pair (a, b), as it is done in the proof theory of input/output logics [13, 14].
These issues are discussed in more detail in Section 3 of this paper.
A remark on notation and terminology. We use Greek letters α, β, γ, . . . for propo-
sitional formulas, and roman letters a, b, c, . . . , p, q, ... for (distinct) propositional atoms.
Throughout this paper the terms “rule" and “conditional norm" will be used interchange-
ably. The term “rule" is most often used in computer science (with reference to so-called
rule-systems and expert systems), and the term “conditional norm" in philosophy and lin-
guistics. Readers should feel free to use the term they prefer. The unconditional obligation
for α will be written as©α, while the conditional obligation for α given β will be written
as O(α|β), or as (β, α). We do not assume a specific semantics for these constructs.
We give two examples below.
Example 1.1 (Deontic explosion). The deontic explosion requirement says that we should
not derive all obligations from a dilemma. Now consider a dilemma with obligations for
α ∧ β and ¬α ∧ γ. It may be tempting to think that an obligation for β ∧ γ should follow:
©(α ∧ β)
©β
©(¬α ∧ γ)
©γ
©(β ∧ γ)
Assuming that we have replacements by logical equivalents, if we substitute a for α, a∨b for
β, and ¬a ∨ b for γ, then we would derive from the obligations for a and ¬a the obligation
for c: deontic explosion. We should not derive the obligation for β ∧ γ, because α ∧ β and
¬α ∧ γ are classically inconsistent. As we show in Section 2.1, the obligation for β ∧ γ
should be derived only under suitable assumptions.
Example 1.2 (Aggregation). Consider an iterative approach deriving from the two norms
“obligatory c given a∧b” and “obligatory b given a” that in some sense we have in context
a that c is obligatory. This derivation of the obligation for c is made by so-called deontic
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detachment, because it is derived from the fact a together with the obligation for b. However,
if the input is a together with the negation of b, then (intuitively) c should not be derived.
However, we can (still intuitively) make the following two derivations. First, we can derive
“obligatory a and b given c,” a norm which is accepted by the two norms (Parent and van
der Torre [18, 19]).
©(α|β ∧ γ),©(β|γ)
©(α ∧ β|γ)
(γ, β), (γ ∧ β, α)
(γ, β ∧ α)
Second, we can also derive the ternary norm “given α, and assuming β, γ is obligatory.”
However, we would need to extend the language with such expressions as done by van der
Torre [27] and Xin & van der Torre [24]. Different motivations for using a ternary operator
can be given. For instance, one may want to reason about exceptions to norms. This is the
approach taken by van der Torre [27], who works with expressions of the form “given α, γ
is obligatory unless β.”
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce benchmark examples
of deontic logic, and discuss them using inference patterns. In Section 3, we introduce
the formal framework and its properties. Our approach is general and conceptual, and we
abstract away from any specific system from literature. The reader will find in the Handbook
of Deontic Logic and Normative Systems sample systems which can serve to exemplify the
general considerations offered in this paper.
The present paper does not cover the notion of permission nor does it cover the notion
of counts-as conditional. These topics will be a subject for future research. The reader is
referred to the chapter by S. O. Hansson and to the chapter by A. Jones and D. Grossi in the
aforementioned handbook for an overview of the state-of-the-art and perspectives for future
research regarding these notions.
2 Benchmark Examples and Inference Patterns
In this section we discuss benchmark examples of deontic logic. The analysis in this section
is based on a number of inference patterns. We do not consider ways in which deontic
statements can be given a semantics. These principles must be understood as expressing
strict rules. For future reference, we list the inference patterns in Table 1, in the order they
are discussed in this section.
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pattern name
©α1,©α2 /©(α1 ∧ α2) AND
©α1,©α2,3(α1 ∧ α2) /©(α1 ∧ α2) RAND
©α1 /©(α1 ∨ α2) W
©(α1|β),©(α2|β),3(α1 ∧ α2) /©(α1 ∧ α2|β) RANDC
©(α1|β) /©(α1 ∨ α2|β) WC
©(α1|β),©(α2|β),3(α1 ∧ α2 ∧ β) /©(α1 ∧ α2|β) RANDC2
©(α1 ∧ α2|β1),©(¬α1 ∧ α3|β1 ∧ β2) /©(¬β2|β1) FC
©(α|β), β /©α FD
©(α|β1) /©(α|β1 ∧ β2) SA
©(α|β1),3(α ∧ β1 ∧ β2) /©(α|β1 ∧ β2) RSA
©(α|β) /©(α|β ∧ ¬α) VD
©(α|β ∧ ¬α) /©(α|β) VD−
©(α|β1), C /©(α|β1 ∧ β2) RSAC
©(α|β) /©(α|β ∧ α) CD
©(α|β ∧ α) /©(α|β) CD−
©(α1|β1),©(¬α1 ∧ α2|β1 ∧ β2) /©(α1|β1 ∧ β2 ∧ ¬α2) RI
©(α1|β1),©(¬α1 ∧ α2|β1 ∧ β2),
©(¬α2|β1 ∧ β2 ∧ β3) /©(α1|β1 ∧ β2 ∧ β3) RIO
©(α|β1),©(α|β2) /©(α|β1 ∨ β2) ORA
©(α|β),©β /©α DD
©(α|β),©(β|γ) /©(α|γ) T
©(α|β ∧ γ),©(β|γ) /©(α|γ) CT
©(α|β ∧ γ),©(β|γ) /©(α ∧ β|γ) ACT
Table 1: Inference patterns
The letter C in RSAC stands for the condition: there is no premise ©(α′ | β′) such
that β1 ∧ β2 logically implies β′, β′ logically implies β1 and not vice versa, α and α′ are
contradictory and α∧β′ is consistent. RSAC is not a rule in the usual proof-theoretic sense.
For it has a statement that quantifies over all other premises as an auxiliary condition. Thus
the rule is not on a par with the other rules, like for instance weakening of the output.
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2.1 Van Fraassen’s Paradox
We first discuss deontic explosion in van Fraassen’s paradox, then the trade-off between on
the one hand “ought implies can” and on the other hand the representation of violations in
the violation detection problem, whether it is forbidden to put oneself into a dilemma, and
finally the use of priorities to resolve conflicts.
2.1.1 Deontic Explosion: Conjunction versus Weakening
It is a well-known problem from paraconsistent logic that the removal of all inconsistent
formulas from the language is insufficient to reason in the presence of a contradiction, be-
cause there may still be explosion in the sense that all formulas of the language are derived
from a contradiction. The following derivation illustrates how we can derive q from p and
¬p in propositional logic, where all formulas in the derivation are classically consistent.
p
q ∨ p ¬p
q ∧ ¬p
q
The rules of replacements of logical equivalents, ∨-introduction, ∧-introduction, and ∧-
elimination are used in this derivation.
A similar phenomenon occurs in deontic logic, if we reason about deontic dilemmas or
conflicts, that is situations where©p and©¬p both hold. Van der Torre and Tan [29] call
this deontic explosion problem “van Fraassen’s paradox,” because van Fraassen [30] gave
the following (informal) analysis of dilemmas in deontic logic. He rejects the conjunction
pattern AND:
AND:
©α1,©α2
©(α1 ∧ α2)
This is because AND warrants the move from©p∧©¬p to©(p∧¬p), and such a conclu-
sion is not consistent with the principle ‘ought implies can’, formalised as ¬ © (p ∧ ¬p).
However, he does not want to reject the conjunction pattern in all cases. In particular, he
wants to be able to derive©(p∧ q) from©p∧©q when p and q are distinct propositional
atoms. His suggestion is that a restriction should be placed on the conjunction pattern: one
derives©(α1 ∧ α2) from©α1 and©α2 only if α1 ∧ α2 is consistent. He calls the latter
inference pattern Consistent Aggregation, renamed to restricted conjunction (RAND) by van
der Torre and Tan in their following variant of van Fraassen’s suggestion.
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Example 2.1 (Van Fraassen’s paradox [29]). Consider a deontic logic without nested modal
operators in which dilemmas like©p ∧ ©¬p are consistent, but which validates ¬ © ⊥,
where⊥ stands for any contradiction like p∧¬p. Moreover, assume that it satisfies replace-
ment of logical equivalents and at least the following two inference patterns Restricted Con-
junction (RAND), also called consistent aggregation, and Weakening (W), where3φ can be
read as “φ is possible” (possibility is not necessarily the same as consistency).
RAND:
©α1,©α2,3(α1 ∧ α2)
©(α1 ∧ α2) W:
©α1
©(α1 ∨ α2)
Moreover, assume the two premises ‘Honor thy father or thy mother!’ ©(f ∨ m) and
‘Honor not thy mother!’ ©¬m. The left derivation of Figure 1 illustrates how the desired
conclusion ‘thou shalt honor thy father’©f can be derived from the premises. Unfortu-
nately, the right derivation of Figure 1 illustrates that we cannot accept restricted conjunc-
tion and weakening in a monadic deontic logic, because we can derive every©β from©α
and©¬α.
©(f ∨m) ©¬m
©(f ∧ ¬m) RAND
©f W
©α
©(α ∨ β) W ©¬α
©(¬α ∧ β) RAND
©β W
Figure 1: Van Fraassen’s paradox
Van Fraassen’s paradox has a counterpart in dyadic deontic logic. The paradox consists
in deriving ©(γ |β) from ©(α |β) and ©(¬α |β) using the following rules of Restricted
Conjunction for the Consequent (RANDC) and Weakening of the Consequent (WC).
RANDC : ©(α1|β),©(α2|β),3(α1 ∧ α2)©(α1 ∧ α2|β) WC :
©(α1|β)
©(α1 ∨ α2|β)
2.1.2 Violation Detection Problem: Unrestricted versus Restricted Conjunction
Whereas p ∧ ¬p can not be derived in a paraconsistent logic, we can consistently represent
the formula©(p∧¬p) in a modal logic, and we can block deontic explosion using a minimal
modal logic [3]. This raises the question whether we should accept the conjunction pattern
unrestrictedly or in its restricted form.
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The choice between the two can be illustrated as follows. Suppose we can derive the
obligation©(p ∧ ¬p) from©(p) and©(¬p) without deriving©f , or any other counter-
intuitive consequence. In that case, is©(p∧¬p) by itself a consequence we want to block?
This presents us with a choice. On the one hand we would like to block©(p∧¬p), because
it contradicts the “ought implies can” principle. On the other hand, we would like to allow
the derivation of©(p∧¬p), because such a formula represents explicitly the fact that there
is a dilemma.
This choice is even more subtle in dyadic deontic logic. There is the extra question as to
whether the “ought implies can” reading implies that the obligation in the consequent must
only be consistent in itself, or consistent with the antecedent too. The latter requirement
is represented by the following variant of the Restricted Conjunction for the Consequent
pattern, which we call RANDC2.
RANDC2 : ©(α1|β),©(α2|β),3(α1 ∧ α2 ∧ β)©(α1 ∧ α2|β)
On the one hand, given ©(p |¬p ∨ ¬q) and ©(q |¬p ∨ ¬q) , we would like to block the
derivation of©(p∧ q|¬p∨¬q) because “ought implies can”. On the other hand, we would
like to be able to derive it in order to make explicit that ¬p ∨ ¬q gives rise to a dilemma,
and is not consistent with the fulfillment of the two obligations appearing as premises.
The alternative restricted conjunction pattern RANDC2 highlights the distinction be-
tween what we call the violability and the temporal interpretation of dyadic deontic logic.
The former interprets the obligation O(α |β) as “given that β has been settled beyond re-
pair, we should do α to make the best out of the sad circumstances” [7] and the latter as “if
α is the case now, what should be the case next?” The violability interpretation says that
O(¬α |α) represents that α is a violation. For example, if you are going to kill, then do it
gently. The temporal interpretation says that the present situation must be changed—which
may or may not indicate a violation. For example, the temporal interpretation may be used
to express a conditional obligation like “if the light is on, turn it off!”
We would like to point out that the violability interpretation is more expressive, in the
sense that the temporal interpretation can be represented by introducing distinct proposi-
tional letters for what is the case now, and what is the case in the next moment. For example,
“if the light is on, turn it off” can be represented by©(¬on2 |on1), where on1 represents
that the light is on now, and on2 that it is on at the next moment in time. In the tempo-
ral interpretation, however, it seems impossible to represent all violations in a natural way.
Thus, a temporal interpretation with future directed obligations only seems to be a strong
limitation.
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We use the name “violation detection problem” to refer to the phenomenon that with
the restricted conjunction pattern the representation (and hence the detection) of violations
is made impossible. We continue the discussion on the violation detection problem in Sec-
tion 2.2, where we discuss restricted inference patterns formalising contrary-to-duty rea-
soning.
2.1.3 Forbidden Conflicts
Here is another question raised by dilemmas: is it forbidden to create a dilemma? The
following inference pattern is called Forbidden Conflict (FC). If the inference pattern is
accepted, then it is not allowed to bring about a conflict, because a conflict is sub-ideal.
FC : ©(α1 ∧ α2|β1),©(¬α1 ∧ α3|β1 ∧ β2)©(¬β2|β1)
Here is an example, taken from van der Torre and Tan [28]. Assume the premises©k and
©(p ∧ ¬k|d), where k can be read as ‘keeping a promise’, p as ‘preventing a disaster’ and
d as ‘a disaster will occur if nothing is done to prevent it’. (FC) yields ©¬d. There are
situations where this is the right outcome. Consider a person having the obligation to keep
a promise to show up at a birthday party. We have©k, but also©(p ∧ ¬k |d). She does
not want to go, and so before leaving she does something that might result in a disaster later
on, like leaving the coffee machine on. During the party, she leaves and goes home, using
her second obligation as an excuse. Nobody will contest that leaving the machine on (on
purpose) was a violation already, viz. ©¬d.
An instance of this inference pattern has been discussed in defeasible deontic logic, and
we return to it in Section 2.3.
2.1.4 Resolving Dilemmas
To resolve a conflict between an obligation for p and an obligation for ¬p, we need addi-
tional information. For example, a total preference order on sets of propositions can re-
solve all dilemmas by picking the preferred set of obligations among the alternatives of the
dilemma, and weaker relations on sets of propositions such as a total pre-order or a partial
order leaves some dilemmas unresolved.
The most studied source for a preference order over sets of propositions is a preference
order over propositions, which is then lifted to an order on sets of propositions. For example,
an ordering on obligations can be derived from an ordering on the authorities who created
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the obligations, or the moment in time they were created. The level of preference of an
obligation may reflect its priority.
Consider three obligations with priority 3, 2 and 1, and a dilemma between the first and
the latter two. To represent the priority of an obligation, we write it in the© notation. A
higher number reflects a higher priority.
{ 3©(p ∧ q), 2©¬p, 1©¬q}
In other words, we can either satisfy the most important obligation 3©(p ∧ q), or two less
important obligations 2©¬p and 1©¬q. Can this dilemma be resolved? There are various
well known possibilities in the area of non-monotonic logic. Whether they can be used
depends on the origin of the priorities and the application.
The issue of lifting priorities from obligations to sets of them gets more challenging
when we consider conditional obligations and deontic detachment, as discussed later on in
Section 2.7.
2.2 Forrester’s Paradox
We first discuss factual detachment in Forrester’s paradox, then the problematic derivation
of secondary obligations from primary ones, and finally what we call the violation detection
problem for Forrester’s paradox.
2.2.1 Factual Detachment versus Conjunction
Forrester’s paradox consists of the four sentences ‘Smith should not kill Jones,’ ‘if Smith
kills Jones, then he should do it gently,’ ‘Smith kills Jones’, and ‘killing someone
gently logically implies killing him.’ The preference based models of dyadic deontic logic
give a natural representation of the two obligations: not killing is preferred to gentle killing,
and both are preferred to other forms of killing. However, the following example illustrates
that it is less clear how to combine dyadic obligation with factual detachment, deriving
unconditional obligations from conditional ones.
Example 2.2 (Forrester’s paradox). Assume a dyadic deontic logic without nested modal
operators that has at least replacement of logical equivalents, the Conjunction pattern AND
and the following inference pattern called factual detachment FD.
FD : ©(α|β), β©α
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Furthermore, assume the following premise set with background knowledge that gentle mur-
der implies murder ã g → k.
S = {©(¬k|Û),©(g|k), k}
The set S represents the Forrester paradox when k is read as ‘Smith kills Jones’ and g
as ‘Smith kills Jones gently.’ We say that the last obligation is a contrary-to-duty obli-
gation with respect to the first obligation, because its antecedent is contradictory with the
consequent of the first obligation. Figure 2 visualizes how we can represent the concept of
contrary-to-duty as a binary relation among dyadic obligations: the obligation©(α2 |β2)
is a contrary-to-duty with respect to©(α1|β1) if and only if β2 ∧ α1 is inconsistent.
©(¬k|Û)
inconsistent
©(g|k)A
AKA
U
Figure 2: ©(g|k) is a contrary-to-duty obligation with respect to©(¬k|Û)
The derivation in Figure 3 illustrates how the obligation©(¬k ∧ g), i.e. ©(⊥), can be
derived from S by FD and AND.
©(¬k|Û) Û
©(¬k) FD
©(g|k) k
©(g) FD
©(¬k ∧ g) AND
Figure 3: Forrester’s paradox
Forrester’s paradox can be given two interpretations. First, the dilemma interpretation
says that the two obligations give rise to a dilemma, just like the obligations©p and©¬p
in van Fraassen’s paradox. Consequently, according to the dilemma interpretation, there is
no problem, the derivation of©(⊥) just reflects the fact that there is a dilemma.
The coherent interpretation appeals to the independent and seemingly plausible prin-
ciple ‘ought implies can’, ¬ © (⊥|α). According to this interpretation, the Forrester set
is intuitively consistent with the ‘ought implies can’ principle, and so there is no dilemma,
just an obligation to act as good as possible in the sub-ideal situation where the primary
obligation has been violated.
There is a consensus in the literature that the example should be given a coherent inter-
pretation, and that the dilemma interpretation is wrong.
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2.2.2 Deriving Secondary Obligations from Primary Ones: Strengthening of the An-
tecedent versus Weakening of the Consequent
The following example shows that Forrester’s paradox can be used also to illustrate that
combining the desirable inference patterns strengthening of the antecedent and weakening
of the consequent is problematic in dyadic deontic logic. For example, strengthening of the
antecedent is used to derive ‘Smith should not kill Jones in the morning’©(¬k|m) from
the obligation ‘Smith should not kill Jones’©(¬k|Û) and weakening of the consequent is
used to derive ‘Smith should not kill Jones’©(¬k|Û) from the obligation ‘Smith should
drive on the right side of the street and not kill Jones’©(r ∧ ¬k|Û).
Example 2.3 (Forrester’s paradox, cont’d [29]). Assume a dyadic deontic logic without
nested modal operators that has at least replacement of logical equivalents and the follow-
ing inference patterns Strengthening of the Antecedent (SA), the Conjunction pattern for
the Consequent (ANDC) and Weakening of the Consequent (WC) .
SA : ©(α|β1)©(α|β1 ∧ β2) ANDC :
©(α1|β),©(α2|β)
©(α1 ∧ α2|β) WC :
©(α1|β)
©(α1 ∨ α2|β)
The derivation in Figure 4 illustrates how the obligation ©(¬k ∧ g|k), i.e. ©(⊥|k), can
be derived from S by SA and ANDC. Note that the dyadic obligation©(¬k|k) can be given
only a violability interpretation in this example, not a temporal interpretation, because it is
impossible to undo a killing. That is, this dyadic obligation can be read only as “if Smith
kills Jones, then this is a violation.”
©(¬k|Û)
©(¬k|k) SA ©(g|k)
©(¬k ∧ g|k) ANDC
©(¬k|Û)
©(¬g|Û) WC
©(¬g|k) RSA ©(g|k)
©(¬g ∧ g|k) ANDC
Figure 4: Forrester’s paradox
The derivation is blocked when SA is replaced by the following inference pattern Re-
stricted Strengthening of the Antecedent (RSA).
RSA : ©(α|β1),3(α ∧ β1 ∧ β2)©(α|β1 ∧ β2)
However, the obligation©(⊥|k) can still be derived from S by WC, RSA and ANDC. This
derivation from the set of obligations is represented on the right hand side of Figure 4. Like
in Example 2.2, we can give the set a dilemma or a coherent interpretation.
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The underlying problem of the counterintuitive derivation in Figure 4 is the derivation
of©(¬g|k) from the first premise©(¬k|Û) by WC and RSA, because it derives a contrary-
to-duty obligation from its own primary obligation.
Since there is consensus that Forrester’s paradox should be given a coherent interpre-
tation, Forrester’s paradox in Example 2.3 shows that combining strengthening of the an-
tecedent and weakening of the consequent is problematic for all deontic logics.
2.2.3 Violation Detection Problem: Restricted versus Unrestricted Strengthening of
the Antecedent
The choice between the unrestricted version and the restricted version of the law of strength-
ening of the antecedent has some similarity with the choice between the unrestricted version
and the restricted version of the law of conjunction. This can be illustrated as follows. Sup-
pose we have the obligation©(¬k|Û). In that case, is©(¬k|k) a consequence we want to
block? This presents us with a choice. On the one hand, we would like to block©(¬k|k),
because it contradics the “ought implies can” principle. On the other hand, we would like
to allow the derivation of©(¬k|k), because this formula represents explicitly that there is
a violation. (Cf. our explanatory comments on the violability interpretation, on p. 10.)
The following inference pattern Violation Detection (VD) formalizes the intuition that an
obligation cannot be defeated by only violating it, and represents a solution to the violation
detection problem. The VD pattern models the intuition that after violation the obligation to
do α is still in force. Even if you drive too fast, you are still obliged to obey the speed limit.
VD : ©(α|β)©(α|β ∧ ¬α) VD
− : ©(α|β ∧ ¬α)©(α|β)
The inverse pattern VD− says that violations do not come out of the blue. Although this
inference pattern may seem intuitive at first sight, it appears too strong on further inspection.
Example 2.4 (Metro). Consider the following derivation.
©(α|β)
©(α|β ∧ ¬α) VD
©(α|α ∨ β) VD
−
For example, assume that if you travel by metro, you must have a ticket. We can derive that
traveling by metro without a ticket is a violation. The two inference patterns together would
derive that if you travel by metro or you buy a ticket, then you must buy a ticket. This is
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counterintuitive, because buying a ticket without traveling by metro does not involve any
obligations. The example illustrates how reasoning about violations only can lead to the
wrong conclusions.
Normative systems typically associate sanctions with violations, as an incentive for
agents to obey the norms. Such sanctions can sometimes be expressed as contrary-to-duty
obligations: the sanction to pay a fine if you do not return the book to the library in time,
can be modelled as a contrary-to-duty obligation to pay the fine. By symmetry, though this
is less often implemented in normative systems, rewards can be associated with compliance
of obligations. In modal logic, an obligation for α is fulfilled if we have α ∧©α.
The following inference pattern Compliance Detection (CD) formalizes the intuition
that an obligation cannot be defeated by only complying with it, analogous to the Violation
Detection (VD) pattern.
CD : ©(α|β)©(α|β ∧ α) CD
− : ©(α|β ∧ α)©(α|β)
The following example illustrates that the inference pattern CD should not be confused
with the inverse of CD−, which seems to say that fulfilled obligations do not come out
of the blue. Although this inference pattern may seem intuitive at first sight, it is highly
counterintuitive on further inspection.
Example 2.5 (Forrester, continued). Consider the following derivation.
©(α ∧ β|α)
©(α ∧ β|α ∧ β) CD
©(α ∧ β|Û) CD
−
You should kill gently, if you kill©(k ∧ g |k). Hence, by CD, you should kill gently, if you
kill gently©(k ∧ g|k ∧ g) (a fulfilled obligation). However, this does not mean that there is
an unconditional obligation to kill gently©(k ∧ g |Û). Hence, the inference pattern CD−
should not be valid.
Without the CD pattern, we say that the fulfilled obligation “disappears,” analogous to
violations. A fulfilled obligation also disappears when we have as an axiom of the logic that
©(α |β) ↔ ©(α ∧ β |β), because in that case ©(α ∧ β |β) does not hold because β is
compliant with a norm.
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2.3 Prakken and Sergot’s Cottage Regulations
We first discuss the extension of Forrester’s paradox with defeasible obligations, then we
return to the violation detection problem, and finally we discuss reinstatement.
2.3.1 Violations and Exceptions
The so-called cottage regulations are introduced by Prakken and Sergot [20] to illustrate the
distinction between contrary-to-duty reasoning and defeasible reasoning based on excep-
tional circumstances. It is an extended version of the Forrester or gentle murderer paradox
discussed in Section 2.2. The following example is an alphabetic variant of the original
example, because we replaced s, to be read as ‘the cottage is by the sea,’ by d, to be read as
‘there is a dog.’ Moreover, as is common, instead of representing background knowledge
that w implies f , Prakken and Sergot represent a white fence by w ∧ f .
Example 2.6 (Cottage regulations [28]). Assume a deontic logic that validates at least
replacement of logical equivalents and the inference pattern RSAC .
RSAC :
©(α|β1), C
©(α|β1 ∧ β2)
C: there is no premise ©(α′ | β′) such that β1 ∧ β2 logically implies β′, β′
logically implies β1 and not vice versa, α and α′ are contradictory and α ∧ β′
is consistent. [26]
RSAC formalises a principle of specificity to deal with exceptional circumstances. It is
illustrated with Figure 5 (a). Suppose we are given these rules: you ought not to eat with
your fingers; if you are served asparagus, you ought to eat with your fingers. One does
not want to be able to strengthen the first obligation into: if you are served asparagus, you
ought not to eat with your fingers. Such a strengthening is blocked by RSAC .
Now, assume the obligations
S = {©(¬f |Û),©(w ∧ f |f),©(w ∧ f |d)},
where f can be read as ‘there is a fence around your house,’ w∧f as ‘there is a white fence
around your house’ and d as ‘you have a dog.’ Notice that©(w ∧ f |f) is a contrary-to-
duty obligation with respect to ©(¬f |Û) and ©(w ∧ f |d) is not. If all we know is that
there is a fence and a dog (f ∧d), then the first obligation in S is intuitively overridden, and
therefore it cannot be violated. Hence, the obligation©(¬f |f ∧d) should not be derivable.
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However, if all we know is that there is a fence without a dog (f ), then the first obligation in
S is intuitively not overridden, and therefore it is violated. Hence, the obligation©(¬f |f)
should be derivable.
One should be careful not to treat both©(w ∧ f |f) and©(w ∧ f |d) as more specific
obligations that override the obligation ©(¬f |Û): this does not hold for ©(w ∧ f |f).
The latter obligation should be treated as a contrary-to-duty obligation, i.e. as a case of
violation. This interference of specificity and contrary-to-duty is represented in Figure 5.
This figure should be read as follows. Each arrow is a condition: a two-headed arrow is
a consistency check, and a single-headed arrow is a logical implication. For example, the
condition C formalizes that an obligation©(α|β) is overridden by©(α′|β′) if the conclu-
sions are contradictory (a consistency check, the double-headed arrow) and the condition
of the overriding obligation is more specific (β′ logically implies β). Case (a) represents
criteria for overridden defeasibility, and case (b) represents criteria for contrary-to-duty.
Case (c) shows that the pair ©(¬f | Û) and ©(w ∧ f | f) can be viewed as overridden
defeasibility as well as contrary-to-duty.
a. overriding (C)
©(α|β)
inconsistent morespecific
©(α′|β′)
6
?
6
b. CTD
©(α|β)
inconsistent
©(α′|β′)
B
B
BM
N
c. interference
©(¬f |Û)
©(w ∧ f |f)
inconsistent morespecific
6
?
6
B
B
BM
N
Figure 5: Specificity and CTD
2.3.2 Violation Detection Problem for Defeasible Obligations
What is most striking about the cottage regulations is the observation that when the premise
©(¬f |Û) is violated by f , then the obligation for ¬f should be derivable, but not when
©(¬f |Û) is overridden by f ∧ d. In other words, we have to distinguish violations from
exceptions.
In approaches where©(α|β) implies that α ∧ β is consistent, we cannot represent this
difference by deriving©(¬f |f) and not deriving©(¬f |d ∧ f). In this sense, this is again
an example of the violation detection problem.
We can use priorities to represent the specificity example, by giving the more specific
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obligation a higher priority. Many conditional logics have specificity built in, but this must
be combined with other conflict resolution methods, for example based on time or authority.
This is an issue of reasoning about uncertainty, default reasoning, and nonmonotonic logic.
2.3.3 Reinstatement
The question raised by the inference pattern Reinstatement (RI) is whether an obligation can
be overridden by an overriding obligation that itself is violated. The obligation©(α1|β1) is
overridden by©(¬α1∧α2|β1∧β2) for β1∧β2, but is it also overridden for β1∧β2∧¬α2?
If the last conclusion is not accepted, then the first obligation α1 should be in force again.
Hence, the original obligation is reinstated.
RI : ©(α1|β1),©(¬α1 ∧ α2|β1 ∧ β2)©(α1|β1 ∧ β2 ∧ ¬α2)
Suppose you are in the street, and see a child’s bike unattended. As a general rule, you
should not take the bike, viz. ©¬t where t is for taking the bike. Now, suppose you also
observe an elderly neighbor collapse with what might be a heart attack. You are a block
away from the nearest phone from which you could call for help. In that more specific
situation, you should take the bike and go call for help, ©(t ∧ h | e), where e and h are
for an elderly neighbor collapses and go call for help, respectively. The obligation©¬t is
overriden by©(t ∧ h|e) for e. But it is not overriden for e ∧ ¬g. Of course, if you do not
go for help, then the prohibition of t remains.
The following inference pattern RIO is a variant of the previous inference pattern RI,
in which the overriding obligation is not factually defeated but overridden. The obligation
©(α1|β1) is overridden by©(¬α1 ∧ α2|β1 ∧ β2) for β1 ∧ β2, and the latter is overridden
by©(¬α2 |β1 ∧ β2 ∧ β3) for β1 ∧ β2 ∧ β3. The inference pattern RIO says that an obliga-
tion cannot be overridden by an obligation that is itself overridden. Hence, an overridden
obligation becomes reinstated when its overriding obligation is itself overridden.
RIO : ©(α1|β1),©(¬α1 ∧ α2|β1 ∧ β2),©(¬α2|β1 ∧ β2 ∧ β3)©(α1|β1 ∧ β2 ∧ β3)
Example: you should not kill; if you find yourselves in a situation of self-defence, you
should kill; if you find yourselves in a situation of self-defence, but your opponent is weak,
you should not kill.
Van der Torre and Tan [28] argue that Reinstatement does not hold in general, for exam-
ple it does not hold for obligations under uncertainty. However, they argue also that these
3013
PARENT AND VAN DER TORRE
patterns hold for so-called prima facie obligations. The notion of prima facie obligation was
introduced by Ross [21]. He writes: ‘I suggest ‘prima facie duty’ or ‘conditional duty’ as a
brief way of referring to the characteristic (quite distinct from that of being a duty proper)
which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind (e.g. the keeping of a promise), of
being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind
which is morally significant’ [21, p.19]. A prima facie duty is a duty proper when it is not
overridden by another prima facie duty. When a prima facie obligation is overridden, it is
not a proper duty but it is still in force: ‘When we think ourselves justified in breaking,
and indeed morally obliged to break, a promise [. . . ] we do not for the moment cease to
recognize a prima facie duty to keep our promise’ [21, p.28].
Van der Torre and Tan argue also that the inference pattern Forbidden Conflict, discussed
in Section 2.1.3, does not hold in general, but it holds for prima facie obligations. If the
inference pattern is accepted, then it is not allowed to bring about a conflict, because a
conflict is sub-ideal, even when it can be resolved.
2.4 Jeffrey’s Disarmament Paradox
In general, reasoning by cases is a desirable property of reasoning with conditionals. In this
reasoning scheme, a certain fact is proven by proving it for a set of mutually exclusive and
exhaustive circumstances. For example, assume that you want to know whether you want
to go to the beach. If you desire to go to the beach when it rains, and you desire to go to the
beach when it does not rain, then you may conclude by this scheme ‘reasoning by cases’
that you desire to go to the beach under all circumstances. The two cases considered here
are rain and no rain. This kind of reasoning schemes can be formalized by the following
derivation: If ‘α if β’ and ‘α if not β,’ then ‘α regardless of β.’ Formally, if we write the
conditional ‘α if β’ by β > α, then it is represented by the following disjunction pattern for
the antecedent.
ORA:
β > α,¬β > α
Û > α
The following example illustrates that the disjunction pattern for the antecedent combined
with strengthening of the antecedent derives counterintuitive consequences in dyadic deon-
tic logic. Example 2.7 is based on the following classic illustration of Jeffrey [11], see also
the discussion by Thomason and Horty [25].
Example 2.7 (Disarmament paradox [29]). Assume a deontic logic that validates at least
replacement of logical equivalents and the two inference patterns RSA and the Disjunction
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pattern for the Antecedent (ORA),
ORA : ©(α|β1),©(α|β2)©(α|β1 ∨ β2)
and assume as premises the obligations ‘we ought to be disarmed if there will be a
nuclear war’, ‘we ought to be disarmed if there will be no war’ and ‘we ought to
be armed if we have peace if and only if we are armed’. They may be formalized
as ©(d | w), ©(d | ¬w) and ©(¬d | d ↔ w), respectively. The derivation in Figure 6
shows how we can derive the counterintuitive©(d ∧ ¬d|d ↔ w). The derived obligation
is inconsistent in most deontic logics, whereas intuitively the set of premises is consistent.
The derivation of©(d |d ↔ w) is counterintuitive, because it is not possible to fulfill this
obligation together with the obligation ©(d | ¬w) it is derived from. The contradictory
fulfillments are respectively d ∧ w and d ∧ ¬w.
©(d|w) ©(d|¬w)
©(d|Û) ORA
©(d|d↔ w) RSA ©(¬d|d↔ w)
©(d ∧ ¬d|d↔ w) AND
Figure 6: The disarmament paradox
In other words, in this derivation the obligation ©(d | d ↔ w) is considered to be
counterintuitive, because it is not grounded in the premises. If d↔ w andw (the antecedent
of the first premise) are true then d is trivially true, and if d ↔ w and ¬w (the antecedent
of the second premise) are true then d is trivially false. In other words, if d ↔ w then
the first premise cannot be violated and the second premise cannot be fulfilled. Hence, the
two premises do not ground the conclusion that for arbitrary d ↔ w we have that ¬d is a
violation.
The example is difficult to interpret, because it makes use of a bi-implication. An al-
ternative set of premises, also based on bi-implications, with analogous counterintuitive
conclusions is {©(d|d↔ w),©(d|¬d↔ w),©(¬d|w)}.
ORA also plays a role in the so-called miners’ scenario introduced recently by Kolodny
and MacFarlane [12].
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2.5 Chisholm’s Paradox
The second contrary-to-duty paradox we consider is Chisholm [4]’s paradox. We first dis-
cuss the choice between deontic versus factual detachment, and then the representation of
deontic detachment. We discuss the violation detection problem for deontic detachment
only in Section 2.6 after we have introduced Makinson’s Möbius strip example.
2.5.1 Deontic versus Factual Detachment
Chisholm’s paradox consists of the three obligations of a certain man ‘to go to his neigh-
bours assistance,’ ‘to tell them that he comes if he goes,’ and ‘not to tell them that he
comes if he does not go,’ together with the fact ‘he does not go.’ The preference-based
models of dyadic deontic logic again give a natural representation of the three sentences,
just like for Forrester’s paradox. For example, going to the assistance and telling is preferred
to all the other possibilities, and not going to the assistance and not telling is preferred to
not going and telling. It seems that the going and not telling and not going and telling may
be ordered in various ways. However, the following example illustrates that it is difficult
to combine factual with deontic detachment, and to derive unconditional obligations from
conditional and unconditional ones.
Example 2.8 (Chisholm’s paradox). Assume a dyadic deontic logic without nested modal
operators that has at least replacement of logical equivalents, the Conjunction pattern AND
factual detachment FD and the following inference pattern deontic detachment DD.
DD : ©(α|β),©β©α
Furthermore, consider the following premise set S.
S = {©(a|Û),©(t|a),©(¬t|¬a),¬a}
The set S formalizes Chisholm’s paradox when a is read as ‘a certain man goes to the
assistance of his neighbors’ and t as ‘the man tells his neighbors that he will come.’
Chisholm’s paradox is more complicated than Forrester’s paradox, because it also contains
an According-To-Duty (ATD) obligation. We can represent the notion of according-to-
duty as a binary relation among conditional obligations, just like the notion of contrary-
to-duty. A conditional obligation ©(α | β) is an ATD obligation of ©(α1 | β1) if and
only if β logically implies α1. The condition of an ATD obligation is satisfied only if the
primary obligation is fulfilled. The definition of ATD is analogous to the definition of CTD
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in the sense that an ATD obligation is an obligation conditional upon the fulfilment of an
obligation and a CTD obligation is an obligation conditional upon a violation. The second
obligation is an ATD obligation and the third obligation is a CTD obligation with respect
to the first obligation, see Figure 7.
20 Xavier Parent and Leendert van der Torre
ATD is analogous to the definitio of CTD in the sense that an ATD bligation is an
obligation conditional upon the fulfilment of an obligat on and a CTD oblig is an
obligation conditional upon a violation. The second obligation is an ATD obligation
and the third obligation is a CTD obligation with respect to the first obligation, see
Figure 7.
 (a|>)
implies
 (t|a)
A
AK
 (a|>)
inconsistent
 (¬t|¬a)
A
AK
U
Figure 7.  (t|a) is an ATD of (a|>) and (¬t|¬a) is a CTD of (a|>)
The derivation in Figure 8 shows how the counterintuitive obligation  (t ^ ¬t),
or ?, can be derived from S by FD, DD and AND. Just like in Forrester’s paradox,
we can give a dilemma and a coherent interpretation to the scenario, and there is con-
sensus that the latter one is preferred. This is not surprising, as Forrester’s paradox
shows that factual detachment and conjunction are problematic in themselves.
 (t|a)
 (a|>) >
 (a) FD
 t DD
 (¬t|¬a) ¬a
 (¬t) FD
 (t ^ ¬t) AND
Figure 8. Chisholm’s paradox
2.5.2 Deriving secondary obligations from primary ones: three kinds of
transitivity
Deontic detachment is related to the following three variants of transitivity: plain
transitivity T, cumulative transitivity CT, and what Parent and van der Torre [2014a;
2014b] call aggregative cumulative transitivity ACT.
T :
 (↵| ), ( | )
 (↵| ) CT :
 (↵|  ^  ), ( | )
 (↵| ) ACT :
 (↵|  ^  ), ( | )
 (↵ ^  | )
The left derivation illustrates that T can be derived from ACT together with SA and
WC, and likewise CT can be derived from T and SA, and T can be derived from CT
and SA. The right derivation illustrates how ANDC can be derived from SA and ACT.
RANDC can be derived analogously from RSA and ACT.
 (↵| )
 (↵|  ^  ) SA  ( | )
 (↵ ^  | ) ACT
 (↵| ) WC
 (↵1| )
 (↵1|  ^ ↵2) SA  (↵2| )
 (↵1 ^ ↵2| ) ACT
The following variant of Chisholm’s paradox illustrates that only ACT can be com-
bined with restricted strengthening of the antecedent.
Figure 7: ©(t|a) is an ATD of©(a|Û) and©(¬t|¬a) is a CTD of©(a|Û)
The deriv tion in Figu e 8 shows how the counterintuitive bligation ©(t ∧ ¬t), or
©⊥, can be d rived from S by FD, DD and AND. Just like in Forrester’s paradox, we can
give a dilemma and a coherent interpretation to the scenario, and there is consensus that
the latter one is preferred. This is not surprising, as Forrester’s paradox shows that factual
detachment and conjunction are problematic in themselves.
©(t|a)
©(a|Û) Û
©(a) FD
©t DD
©(¬t|¬a) ¬a
©(¬t) FD
©(t ∧ ¬t) AND
Figure 8: Chisholm’s paradox
2.5.2 Deriving Secondary Obligations from Primary Ones: Three Kinds of Transi-
tivity
Deontic detachment is related to the following three variants of transitivity: plain transitivity
T, cumulative transitivity CT, and what Parent and van der Torre [18, 19] call aggregative
cumulative transitivity ACT.
T : ©(α|β),©(β|γ)©(α|γ) CT :
©(α|β ∧ γ),©(β|γ)
©(α|γ) ACT :
©(α|β ∧ γ),©(β|γ)
©(α ∧ β|γ)
The left derivation illustrates that T can be derived from ACT together with SA and WC,
and likewise CT can be derived from T and SA, and T can be derived from CT and SA. The
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right derivation illustrates how ANDC can be derived from SA and ACT. RANDC can be
derived analogously from RSA and ACT.
©(α|β)
©(α|β ∧ γ) SA ©(β|γ)
©(α ∧ β|γ) ACT
©(α|γ) WC
©(α1|β)
©(α1|β ∧ α2) SA ©(α2|β)
©(α1 ∧ α2|β) ACT
The following variant of Chisholm’s paradox illustrates that only ACT can be combined
with restricted strengthening of the antecedent.
Example 2.9 (Chisholm’s paradox, continued). Assume a dyadic deontic logic that vali-
dates at least replacement of logical equivalents and the (intuitively valid) inference pat-
terns RSA (or SA), T (or CT), and ANDC.
The left derivation in Figure 9 illustrates how the counterintuitive ©(⊥ |¬a) can be
derived from S. Again we can give a dilemma and a coherent interpretation, and there
is consensus in the literature that it should get a coherent interpretation. The underlying
problem is the derivation of ©(t | ¬a), which seems counterintuitive since it derives a
contrary-to-duty obligation from the primary©(a |Û). If we accept RSA, then we cannot
accept T or CT.
©(t|a) ©(a|Û)
©(t|Û) T/CT
©(t|¬a) RSA ©(¬t|¬a)
©(t ∧ ¬t|¬a) AND
©(t|a) ©(a|Û)
©(a ∧ t|Û) ACT
©(t|Û) WC
©(t|¬a) RSA ©(¬t|¬a)
©(t ∧ ¬t|¬a) AND
Figure 9: Chisholm’s paradox
Assume a dyadic deontic logic that validates at least replacement of logical equivalents
and the (intuitively valid) inference patterns RSA, ANDC, WC and ACT. The right derivation
of Figure 9 illustrates how the counterintuitive©(⊥|¬a) can be derived from S. However,
without WC the counterintuitive obligation cannot be derived.
When we compare the two derivations of the contrary-to-duty paradoxes in dyadic de-
ontic logic, we find the following similarity. The underlying problem of the counterintuitive
derivations is the derivation of the obligation©(α1|¬α2) from©(α1 ∧ α2|Û) by WC and
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RSA. It is respectively the derivation of©(¬g|k) from©(¬k|Û) in Figure 3 and©(t|¬a)
from©(a ∧ t |Û) in Figure 9. The underlying problem of the contrary-to-duty paradoxes
is that a contrary-to-duty obligation can be derived from its primary obligation. It is no sur-
prise that this derivation causes paradoxes. The derivation of a secondary obligation from a
primary obligation confuses the different contexts found in contrary-to-duty reasoning. The
context of primary obligation is the ideal state, whereas the context of a contrary-to-duty
obligation is a violation state. Preference-based deontic logics were developed to seman-
tically distinguish the different violation contexts in a preference ordering, but it appears
more challenging to represent these contexts in derivations.
2.6 Makinson’s Möbius Strip
Makinson [13]’s Möbius strip illustrates that dilemmas and deontic detachment can also
be combined, leading to new challenges and distinctions. We discuss also the violation
detection problem for deontic detachment.
2.6.1 Iterated deontic detachment
The so-called Möbius strip (whose name comes from the shape of the example in Figure 10)
arises when we allow for deontic detachment to be iterated. We give the version of the
example presented by Makinson and van der Torre in their input/output logic, though we
use the dyadic representation.
b
a
c
Figure 10: Möbius strip
Example 2.10 (Möbius strip). Consider three conditional obligations stating ¬a is obliga-
tory given c, that c is obligatory given b, and that b is obligatory given a, together with the
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fact that a is true.
©(¬a|c),©(c|b),©(b|a), a
For instance, a, b, c could represent “Alice (respectively Bob,Carol) is invited to dinner."
The obligation©(b|a) says that if Alice is invited then Bob should be, and so on.
Makinson [13] gives what we call here the coherent interpretation. He mentions that
“intuitively, we would like to have” that under condition a, each of b and c is obliga-
tory, even though we may not want to conclude for ¬a under the same condition. He also
indicates that “an approach inspired by maxi choice in AGM theory change” (like the one
described in the paper in question) leads to three possible outcomes: both b and c are oblig-
atory; only b is obligatory; neither of b and c is obligatory. The three sets of obligations
corresponding to these outcomes are linearily ordered under set-theoretical inclusion.
In their input/output logic framework, Makinson and van der Torre [15] present what
we call here the dilemma interpretation of the example. They change the definitions such
that precisely the dilemma among these three alternatives is the desired outcome of the
example.
There does not seem to be consensus in the literature on which interpretation is the
intuitive answer for this example. Deontic detachment has been severely criticised in the
literature, so it may be questioned whether full transitivity is natural. However, the choice
between coherent and dilemma interpretation is general and can be found in other examples,
such as the following variant of Chisholm’s paradox.
Example 2.11 (Chisholm’s paradox, continued). Consider this variant of the Möbius strip:
{©(d|c),©(c|b),©(b|a), a,¬d}
By symmetry with the dilemma interpretation of Möbius strip, the dilemma interpretation
gives three alternatives, {©b,©c}, {©b} and ∅. Now consider deontic detachment in
Chisholm’s paradox, together with the fact that we do not tell.
©(t|a),©(a|Û),¬t
Again by symmetry, the dilemma interpretation gives two alternatives, {©a} and ∅.
The following example has been introduced by Horty [9] in a prioritised setting, and we
will consider it again in the section that comes next. Again the question is raised whether
one solution can be a subset of another solution.
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Example 2.12 (Order). Consider the following set of obligations. a is for putting the heat-
ing on, and b is for opening the window.
©(a|Û),©(b|Û),©(¬b|a)
The example is a dilemma, but the question is whether there are two or three alterna-
tives. According to the first interpretation, the only two alternatives are the obligations for
a and b, and the obligations for a and ¬b. According to the second interpretation, there is
also the alternative of an obligation for b, without an obligation for a. The latter alternative
is a subset of another alternative, analogous to the dilemma interpretation of the Möbius
strip example.
2.6.2 Violation detection problem and transitivity
In the previous subsections, like most authors we have assumed that in the Möbius strip the
derivation of the obligation for ¬a is intuitively not desirable. However, one can also view
it as being intuitively desirable, for the following reason.
Example 2.13 (Möbius strip, continued). Consider first the coherent interpretation of the
Möbius strip, deriving obligations for b and c, but not for ¬a. With the transitivity T pattern,
one may consider the derivation of the obligation for¬a. This represents that awas actually
a violation. With ACT, the violation can be represented by an obligation for b ∧ c ∧ ¬a.
Consider now the dilemma interpretation, presenting three possible outcomes, either
{©b,©c}, or {©b}, or ∅. In that case, a leads to a choice, and we may thus have an
instance of the forbidden conflict pattern FC that derives that a is forbidden.
2.7 Priority
We are given a set S of conditional obligations along with a priority relation defined on
them.
Example 2.14 (Order [9], continued from Example 2.12). Numbers represent the priority
of the obligation, as in Section 2.1.4. Consider
{ 3©(¬b|a), 2©(b|Û), 1©(a|Û)}
1©, 2©, and 3© can be thought of as expressing commands uttered by a priest, a bishop, and
a cardinal, respectively. There are three interpretations. The greedy interpretation derives
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obligations for a and b. It looks strange, because complying with 1©(a|Û) triggers the most
important norm 3©(¬b|a), which in turn cancels 2©(b|Û). To put it another way, complying
with 1©(a|Û) and 2©(b|Û) results in violating 3©(¬b|a).
The last link interpretation derives ©a and ©¬b. This looks strange too, because
2©(b|Û) takes precedence over 1©(a|Û), and 3©(¬b|a) will not be triggered (and 2©(b|Û)
cancelled) unless 1©(a|Û) is fulfilled.
The weakest link interpretation derives©b only. In order not to trigger 3©(¬b|a), and
avoid being in a violation state with respect to it, the agent goes for 2©(b|Û) only.
The idea underpinning Parent [16]’s next example is similar. Parent argues that different
outcomes are expected depending on whether the example is instantiated in the deontic or
epistemic domain.
Example 2.15 (Cancer [16]). Assume we have
{ 3©(c|b), 2©(b|a), 1©(¬b|a)}
a is for the set of data used to set up a treatment against cancer, b is for receiving chemo as
per the protocol, and c is for keeping WBCs (White Blood Cells) count to a safe level using
a drug. In a diagram:
data chemo safe wbc count
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 11: Cancer
Assume the input is a. In that case, we get 2©(b|a) and 3©(c|b), which derives©b and
©c. Given a, both 1©(¬b |a) and 2©(b |a) are triggered. These two conflict. The stronger
obligation takes precedence over the weaker one.
Assume the input is {a,¬c}. In that case, we get 1©(¬b |a) which derives ©¬b. The
reason why may be explained as follows. Following one of Hansson [7]’s suggestions, one
might think of the input as someting settled as true. The question is: shall the agent do b or
not? The ordering 2© > 1© says that b has priority over ¬b. So it would seem to follow that
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he should do b. But, in reply, it can be said that the ordering 3© > 2© tells us that compliance
with the stronger of the two conflicting norms triggers an obligation of even higher rank,
namely the obligation to do c. Furthermore, c is already (settled as) false. Hence if the agent
goes for b he will put himself in a violation state with respect to a norm with an even higher
rank. The only way to avoid the violation of the most important norm is to go for ¬b. This
is fully in line with what practitioners do: if the WBCs count cannot be maintained at a safe
level, chemo is postponed.
adult employed
(a) (b) (c)
student
Figure 12: Student example
In the epistemic domain, a different outcome is expected. This can be seen using the
reliability interpretation discussed by Horty [9, p. 391] among others. Under the latter inter-
pretation, an epistemic conditional indicates something like a high conditional probability
that its conclusion is satisfied, and the priority ordering measures relative strength of these
conditional probabilities. For illustration purposes, assume that these conditional probabil-
ities encode statistical assertions about some population groups, and instantiate a, b and c
into (this is the example often used to illustrate the non-transitivity of default patterns) being
a student, being an adult, and being employed. This is shown in Figure 12. Given input
{a,¬c}, the expected output remains b.
3 Formal Framework
We extract ten basic properties from the examples, falling in three groups. We believe that
the properties of factual detachment and violation detection, the logical properties of substi-
tution, replacement by logical equivalents, implication and paraconsistency are desirable for
methods to reason with normative systems, and that the properties of aggregation, factual
and norm monotony, and norm induction are optional.
In this section we use the detachment terminology instead of the inference rules termi-
nology.
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3.1 Norms, Obligations and Factual Detachment
The distinction between norms and obligations is fundamental in the modern approach to
deontic logic. They are related via factual detachment, the detachment of an obligation from
a norm.
3.1.1 Representing Norms and Imperatives Explicitly
There are two traditions in normative reasoning, as witnessed by the two historical chapters
in the Handbook on Deontic Logic and Normative Systems [5]. The first tradition of deontic
logic is concerned with logical relations between obligations and permissions, or between
the actual and the ideal. The second tradition of normative systems is concerned with nor-
mative reasoning, including reasoning about imperatives. Many people suggested a more
comprehensive approach, by bringing the two traditions closer to each other, or proposing
a uniform approach. For example, when van Fraassen [30] is asking himself whether re-
stricted conjunction can be formalized to reason about dilemmas, he suggests to represent
imperatives explicitly.
“But can this [...] be reflected in the logic of the ought-statements alone? Or
can it be expressed only in a language in which we can talk directly about the
imperatives as well? This is an important question, because it is the question
whether the inferential structure of the ‘ought’ language game can be stated in
so simple a manner that it can be grasped in and by itself. Intuitively, we want
to say: there are simple cases, and in the simple cases the axiologist’s logic
is substantially correct even if it is not in general—but can we state precisely
when we find ourselves in such a simple case? These are essentially technical
questions for deontic logic, and I shall not pursue them here.” [30]
The distinction between norms and obligations was most clearly put forward by Makin-
son [13], and we follow his notational conventions. To detach an obligation from a norm,
there must be a context, and the norms must be conditional. Consequently, norms are a
particular kind of rules.
3.1.2 Formal Representation
In this section, a set of norms is represented by a set of pairs of formulae from a base
logic, (a1, x1), . . . , (an, xn). A norm (a, x) can be read as “if a is the case, then x ought
to be the case.” A normative system contains at least one set of norms, the regulative
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norms from which obligations and prohibitions can be detached. It often contains also
permissive norms, from which explicit permissions can be detached, and constitutive norms,
from which institutional facts can be detached.
The context is represented by a set of formulae of the same logic. A deontic operator©
factually detaches obligations, represented by a set of formulae of the base logic, from a set
of norms N in a context A, written as©(N,A). Unless there is a need for it, we adopt the
convention that we do not prefix the detached formula with a modal operator. For example,
from a norm that if you travel by metro, you must have a valid ticket (metro, ticket) in the
context where you travel by metro, we derive ticket ∈ ©({(metro, ticket)}, {metro}), but
ticket itself is not prefixed with a deontic modality. Note that there is no risk of confusing
facts and obligations. We know that ticket represents an obligation for ticket, because it is
factually detached by the© operator.
To facilitate presentation and proofs, in this paper we assume propositional logic as
the base logic. We write β ∈ ©(N,α) for β ∈ ©(N, {α}), and γ ∈ ©((α, β), A) for
γ ∈ ©({(α, β)}, A).
3.1.3 Arguments
Maybe the most important technical innovation of the modern approach is the following
convention of writing an argument for α supported by A, traditionally written as A ∴ α, as
a pair (A,α):
(A,α) ∈ ©(N) = α ∈ ©(N,A)
We can move between©(N) and©(N,A) as we move between ã and Cn in classical
logic.
It is crucial to understand that the representation of arguments by a pair (A,α) is just
a technical method to develop logical machinery: we use it to give more compact repre-
sentations, to provide proof systems, and to make relations with other branches of logic.
However, if you want to know what the argument (A,α) ∈ ©(N) means, then you always
have to translate it back to α ∈ ©(N,A).
We reserve the term “norms" to explicit norms, in N . Obviously, one does not derive
norms from norms.
In this section we give both the long and the short version of the properties we discuss,
to prevent misreading.
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3.1.4 Factual Detachment
Factual detachment says that if there is a norm with precisely the context as antecedent, then
the output contains the consequent. On the one hand this is relatively weak, as we require
the context to be precisely the antecedent. A much stronger detachment principle imposes
detachment when the antecedent is implied by the context. Between these two extremes,
we can have that most obligations are detached, or in the most normal cases the obligation
is detached. On the other hand the factual detachment principle is also quite strong, as in
context a from the norm (a,⊥) the contradiction ⊥ is detached, and in case of a dilemma
of (a, x) and (a,¬x), in context a both x and ¬x are detached.
Definition 3.1 (Factual detachment). A deontic operator© satisfies the factual detachment
property if and only if for all sets of norms N and all sentences α and β we have:
(α, β) ∈ N
β ∈ ©(N,α) FD
(α, β) ∈ N
(α, β) ∈ ©(N) FD
(α, β) ∈ N
(α, β) FD
3.2 Violation Detection
The distinctive feature of norms and obligations with respect to other types of rules and
modalities is that they can be violated. Obligations which cannot be violated are not real
obligations, but obligations of a degenerated kind. It is not only that ought implies can, but
more importantly, ought implies can-be-violated. Issues concerning violations can be found
in most deontic examples. For example, dilemma examples arise because some obligation
has to be violated, and contrary-to-duty examples arise because some obligation has been
violated.
Modal logic offers a simple representation for violations. An obligation for α has been
violated if and only we have ¬α ∧ ©α. In our notation with explicit norms, this is α ∈
©(N,A) with ¬α ∈ Cn(A).
To make sure that violated obligations do not drown, we use the violation detection
inference pattern, which we already discussed in Section 2.2.3.
Definition 3.2 (Violation Detection). A deontic operator© satisfies the violation detection
property if and only for all sets of norms N , all sets of sentences A and all sentences α we
have:
α ∈ ©(N,A)
α ∈ ©(N,A ∪ {¬α})VD
(A,α)
(A ∪ {¬α}, α)VD
Consequently, the restricted strengthening of the antecedent pattern is too weak.
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3.3 Substitution
Whereas the first two properties define what is special about deontic logic, namely factual
detachment and violation detection, the next four properties of substitution, replacements
of logical equivalence, implication and paraconsistency say something about logic.
The first logical requirement is substitution, well known from classical propositional
logic. It says that we can uniformly replace propositional letters by propositional formulae.
Definition 3.3 (Substitution). Let a uniform substitution map each proposition letter to a
propositional formula. A deontic operator© satisfies substitution if and only for all sets of
norms N , all sets of formulae A, all sentences α and all uniform substitutions σ we have:
α ∈ ©(N,A)
α[σ] ∈ ©(N [σ], A[σ]) SUB
For example, it allows to replace propositional letters by distinct new letters, thus re-
naming them. This is an example of irrelevance of syntax, a core property of logic.
3.4 Replacement of Logical Equivalents
The following definition introduces two stronger types of irrelevance of syntax.
Definition 3.4 (Irrelevance of Syntax). Let Cn be closure under logical consequence, and
Eq closure under logical equivalence: α ∈ Eq(S) if and only if there is a β in S such that
Cn(α) = Cn(β). We write Eq(a1, . . . , an) for Eq({a1, . . . , an}), and Cn(a1, . . . , an) for
Cn({a1, . . . , an}). Here Cn is the consequence operation of the base logic on top of which
the deontic operator© operates.
A deontic operator© satisfies formula input (output) irrelevance of syntax if and only
for all sets of norms N and all sets of formulae A we have:
©(N,A) =©(N,Eq(A)) (©(N,A) = Eq(©(N,A)))
and it satisfies set input (output) irrelevance of syntax if and only if for all sets of norms N
and all sets of formulae A we have:
©(N,A) =©(N,Cn(A))) (©(N,A) = Cn(©(N,A)))
The following example illustrates the various types of irrelevance of syntax.
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Example 3.5 (Irrelevance of syntax). LetN = {(a, x), (a, y)} andA = {a}. The following
table lists some possibilities for©(N,A):
∅ {x, y} {x, y, x ∧ y}
{x ∧ y, y ∧ x} {x ∧ y, y ∧ x, x, y} {x ∧ y, y ∧ x, x, y, x ∨ y, y ∨ x}
Eq(x ∧ y) Eq(x ∧ y, x, y) Eq(x ∧ y, x, y, x ∨ y)
Cn(x) ∪ Cn(y) Cn(x ∧ y)
The first row gives some deontic operators which do not satisfy basic properties. For
example, ∅ does not satisfy factual detachment, {x, y} does not satisfy conjunction, and
{x, y, x ∧ y} does not satisfy variable renaming. That is, if we replace x and y in N , then
we end up with the same set, but if we replace x and y in the output, we obtain y ∧ x. This
violates the most basic property of irrelevance of syntax.
The second row gives some examples satisfying variable renaming for x and y. The
set of obligations {x ∧ y, y ∧ x} does not satisfy factual detachment again, and the set
{x ∧ y, y ∧ x, x, y, x ∨ y, y ∨ x} satisfies besides closure under conjunction also closure
under disjunction. Whether this is desired depends on the application. However, all three
examples do not satisfy formula output irrelevance of syntax. For example, they all three
derive x ∧ y, but they do not derive the logically equivalent x ∧ x ∧ y.
The third and fourth row close the output under logical equivalence and logical conse-
quence, respectively. Cn(x ∧ y) in the last row satisfies set output irrelevance of syntax.
Input irrelevance is analogous to output irrelevance. For example, when the input is
a ∧ a rather than a, it may or may not derive again the same output. If it does not, then the
operator violates formula input irrelevance of syntax. Moreover, if it does not treat {a, b}
and {a ∧ b} the same, then it violates input set irrelevance of syntax.
The following example illustrates that output set irrelevance of syntax is too strong in
the context of dilemmas, because it may lead to deontic explosion.
Example 3.6 (Irrelevance of syntax, continued). Let
N = {(a, x ∧ y), (a,¬x ∧ y)}
andA = {a}. The following table lists some possibilities for©(N,A). We only list options
closed under logical equivalence, i.e. which satisfy output formula irrelevance of syntax.
Eq(x ∧ y,¬x ∧ y) Eq(x ∧ y,¬x ∧ y, x ∧ ¬x ∧ y)
Eq(x ∧ y,¬x ∧ y, y) Eq(x ∧ y,¬x ∧ y, y, x ∧ ¬x ∧ y)
Cn(x ∧ y) ∪ Cn(¬x ∧ y) Cn(x ∧ y) ∪ Cn(¬x ∧ y) ∪ Eq(x ∧ ¬x ∧ y)
Cn(x ∧ y,¬x ∧ y)
3028
DETACHMENT IN NORMATIVE SYSTEMS
The last set Cn(x ∧ y,¬x ∧ y) derives the whole language, and thus gives rise to
explosion. Hence we cannot accept it. The example illustrates that we cannot accept set
output irrelevance of syntax.
The difference between the left and right column is that the right column is closed under
conjunction, and represents with inconsistent formulae that there is a dilemma.
The difference between the first and the second row is that the second row is closed
under disjunction. The difference between the second and the third row is that consistent
formulae are closed under logical consequence.
Cn(x ∧ y) ∪Cn(¬x ∧ y) ∪Eq(x ∧ ¬x ∧ y)) has the feature that violations and other
obligations are treated in a distinct way.
In this paper we require set input irrelevance of syntax, and formula output irrelevance of
syntax. In addition, along the same lines we require that we can replace formulae within the
norms by logically equivalent ones. All together, it corresponds to the following property
of replacement of logical equivalents.
Definition 3.7 (Replacement of logically equivalent expressions). We say that two norms
ar similar, written as (α1, β1) ≈ (α2, β2), if and only if Cn(α1) = Cn(α2), and N ≈M if
and only if for all (α1, β1) ∈ N there is a (α2, β2) ∈M such that (α1, β1) ≈ (α2, β2), and
vice versa. A deontic operator© satisfies the replacement of Logical Equivalents property
if and only if for all sets of normsN andM , all sets of formulaeA andB, and all sentences
α and β we have:
N ≈M,Cn(A) = Cn(B), Cn(α) = Cn(β), α ∈ ©(N,A)
β ∈ ©(M,B) RLE
The examples illustrate that there are other options in between formula and set output
irrelevance of syntax, such as requiring that the output is closed under conjunction, or under
disjunction, or both. We consider them in Section 3.7.
The principle of irrelevance of syntax has been criticized in belief revision theory. It is
discussed by [23] in the context of a study of the notion of revision of a normative system.
This notion falls outside the scope of the present paper, and must be left as a topic for future
research.
3.5 Implication
The four properties FD, VD, SUB and RLE defined thus far may be called positive properties,
in the sense that they require something to be obligatory. That is why we could represent
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them as Horn rules: given a set of conditions, we require some obligation to be derivable.
This contrasts with the examples in Section 2, where typically too much is derived.
The implication requirement in this section and the paraconsistency requirement in the
following section may be called negative properties, in the sense that they forbid something
to be obligatory. The first requirement makes use of the so-called materialisation of a nor-
mative system, which means that each norm (a, x) is interpreted as a material conditional
a → x, i.e. as the propositional sentence ¬a ∨ x. The implication requirement says that
if the materializations of N , written as m(N), do not imply a → x, then (a, x) /∈ ©(N).
This represents the idea that we cannot derive more than we can derive in propositional
logic. In general, implication in the base logic is the upper bound.
Definition 3.8 (Implication). Let m(N) = {a → x | (a, x) ∈ N} be the set of material-
izations of N . A deontic operator© satisfies the implication property if and only if for all
sets of norms N and all sets of sentences A we have©(N,A) ⊆ Cn(m(N) ∪A).
The elements ({α}, β) of ©(N) are a subset of {(α, β) | α → β ∈ Cn(m(N))}.
In most systems, the base logic is classical propositional logic, but it need not be so. For
instance, Cn may be the consequence relation of intuitionistic propositional logic, as in
[17]. Cn may also be what Makinson calls a pivotal consequence relation CnK , defined by
CnK(A) = C(A ∪ K), where K is a set of formulas, and C is the consequence relation
of classical propositional logic. [22] defines and studies two such input/output operations.
They are aimed to model the interplay between norms and so-called material dependencies.
We have©(N,A) ⊆ CnK(m(N) ∪A).
3.6 Paraconsistency
To prevent explosion we do not want to derive the whole language, unless maybe in patho-
logical cases in which the normative system contains a norm for each propositional formula.
A consequence relation may be said to be paraconsistent if it is not explosive, though there
are various ways to make this formal.
To define our paraconsistency requirement, we distinguish obligations representing vio-
lations from other obligations. That is, we decompose an operator©(N,A) into two opera-
tors V (N,A) and V (N,A), such that we have V (N,A) = {x ∈ ©(N,A) | ¬x ∈ Cn(A)}
and V (N,A) =©(N,A) \ V (N,A). Trivially, we have
©(N,A) = V (N,A) ∪ V (N,A)
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The basic idea of our paraconsistency requirement is that obligations in V can be derived
from a set of norms M in N , such that this set of norms M does not explode.
Definition 3.9 (Paraconsistency). A deontic operator© satisfies the paraconsistency prop-
erty if and only if for all sets of norms N , all sets of formulae A and all sentences α, if
α ∈ V (N,A), then there is a M ⊆ N such that α ∈ ©(M,A) and ©(M,A) ∪ A is
classically consistent.
Implication and paraconsistency together imply that if α ∈ V (N,A), then there is
a M ⊆ N such that α ∈ Cn(m(N) ∪ A) and ©(M,A) ∪ A is classically consistent.
This suggest an additional condition: if α ∈ V (N,A), then there is a M ⊆ N such that
α ∈ Cn(m(N) ∪A) and m(N) ∪A is classically consistent.
The underlying intuition to restrict to a set of norms was already raised in Example 1.1
in the introduction. There we observe that if we can derive©(β ∧ γ) from©(α ∧ β) and
©(¬α∧ γ), and we have substitution and replacements of logical equivalents, then we also
derive©(β) from©(α) and©(¬α), in other words, we have deontic explosion. This can
be verified by replacing β by α∨β and γ by ¬α∨β. Therefore, we restrict the set of norms
we use to a set of norms which is in some sense “consistent” with the input A.
3.7 Aggregation
The last four properties of aggregation, factual and norm monotony, and norm induction
determine the kind of deontic logics we are going to study in our framework. We believe
that other choices at this point may be of interest too, but we do not pursue them in this
paper.
Aggregation is a core issue in van Fraassen’s paradox.
Definition 3.10 (Aggregation). A deontic operator© satisfies the aggregation property if
and only if for all sets of norms N , sets of sentences A and sentences α and β we have
α, β ∈ ©(N,A)
α ∧ β ∈ ©(N,A)AND
(A,α), (A, β)
(A,α ∧ β) AND
Van Fraassen’s paradox shows that therefore we cannot accept weakening of the con-
sequent. In the context of our present framework, we prefer to call it weakening of the
output.
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Definition 3.11. A deontic operator© satisfies the weakening of the output property if and
only if for all sets of norms N , sets of sentences A and sentences α and β we have
α ∧ β ∈ ©(N,A)
α, β ∈ ©(N,A) WO
(A,α ∧ β)
(A,α), (A, β)WO
Proposition 3.12. There is no operator© satisfying simultaneously paraconsistency, ag-
gregation, and weakening of the output.
Proof. Assume the statement does not hold, so there is a deontic © satisfying paracon-
sistency, aggregation and weakening of the output. Consider van Fraassen’s paradox N =
{(Û, p), (Û,¬p)}. According to aggregation and weakening of the output, we have (Û, q) ∈
©(N). According to paraconsistency, (Û, q) /∈ ©(N). Contradiction.
3.8 Factual Monotony
In this paper we are interested in monotonic logics. Though non-monotonic logics may
have their applications too, we believe they should be build on top of the monotonic ones.
Definition 3.13 (Factual monotony). The factual monotony property holds for © if and
only if for all sets of norms N , and all sets of sentences A and B, we have ©(N,A) ⊆
©(N,A ∪B).
As this implies strengthening of the antecedent, Forrester’s paradox illustrates that we
cannot accept weakening of the consequent.
Proposition 3.14. There is no operator© satisfying simultaneously paraconsistency, fac-
tual monotony, and weakening of the output.
Proof. Assume the statement does not hold, so there is a deontic© satisfying paraconsis-
tency, factual monotony and weakening of the output. Consider the first norm of Forrester’s
paradox N = {(Û,¬k)}. According to factual monotony and weakening of the output, we
have (k,¬k ∨ g) ∈ ©(N). According to paraconsistency, (k,¬k ∨ g) /∈ ©(N). Contra-
diction.
3.9 Norm Monotony
Definition 3.15 (Norm monotony). A deontic operator © satisfies the property of norm
monotony if and only if for all sets of norms N and M we have©(N) ⊆ ©(N ∪M).
A deontic operator© satisfies the property of monotony if and only if it satisfies those of
factual and norm monotony, i.e. for allN,M,A,B we have©(N,A) ⊆ ©(N∪M,A∪B).
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3.10 Norm Induction
Norm induction says that if there is an output β for an input α, and we add the norm (α, β)
to the normative system, then for all inputs, the output of the normative system stays the
same. We call it norm induction, because the norm is induced from the relation between
facts and obligations. The norm induction requirement considers a set M of such pairs
(α, β).
Definition 3.16 (Norm induction). A deontic operator © verifies the property of norm
induction if and only if for all sets of norms N and M and all sets of sentences A we have
M ⊆ ©(N)⇒©(N) =©(N ∪M)
The strong norm induction principle strengthens the norm induction principle to expan-
sion of the normative system with new norms.
Definition 3.17 (Strong norm induction). A deontic operator © satisfies the property of
strong norm induction if and only if for all sets of normsN ,N ′,M , and all sets of sentences
A we have M ⊆ ©(N)⇒©(N ∪N ′) =©(N ∪N ′ ∪M)
Clearly we have that the strong norm induction property implies the norm induction
property.
Together, factual detachment, monotony and norm induction are equivalent to requiring
that© is a closure operator.
Definition 3.18 (Closure operator). © is a closure operator if and only if it satisfies the
following three properties:
INCLUSION N ⊆ ©(N)
MONOTONY N ⊆M implies©(N) ⊆ ©(M)
IDEMPOTENCE ©(N) =©(©(N))
Their counterparts in terms of Cn are knowns as the “Tarskian” conditions, after A.
Tarski. They can each be rephrased in terms of ã (‘proves’) as follows.
REFLEXIVITY A ã x for all x ∈ A
MONOTONY A ã x implies A ∪B ã x
TRANSITIVITY A ã x for all x ∈ B and B ã y imply A ã y
Inclusion for Cn translates into reflexivity of ã. Monotony for Cn translates into monotony
of ã. Idempotence of Cn corresponds to the transitivity of ã.
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4 Summary
Table 2 lists the examples we discussed in this paper. Given that the world is full of conflicts,
we have that normative systems are developed by humans and full of inconsistencies. We
need to represent dilemmas consistently, if only to consider their resolution. Van Fraassen’s
paradox illustrates that doing so presents a basic dilemma: do we accept aggregation or
closure under consequence? Forrester’s paradox seems to indicate a dilemma too, as it
presents two alternatives. In the cottage regulations, such a dilemma interpretation makes
sense: either remove the fence, or paint it white. However, in Forrester’s gentle murderer
example, you cannot undo killing someone. So only the coherent interpretation makes
sense. Dilemmas can be resolved by explicit priorities, for example reflecting the authority
creating the obligation, or it can be derived from the specificity of the obligations. In the
latter case, as illustrated by the cottage regulations, we have to be careful to distinguish
violations from exceptions. Jeffrey’s disarmament illustrates the problem of reasoning by
cases in deontic reasoning. When conditions have an epistemic reading, reasoning by cases
may not be valid. Deontic detachment and transitivity originate from Chisholm’s paradox,
though it is known in the literature as a contrary-to-duty paradox rather than a deontic
detachment paradox. Chisholm’s paradox illustrates that an alternative representation of
the transitivity pattern makes it analogous to Forrester’s paradox. Makinson’s Möbius strip
illustrates many of the problems of reasoning with transitivity. In particular, the dilemma
interpretation highlights that we can have solutions being a strict subset of other solutions.
More priority examples are introduced in the area of epistemic reasoning, and reasoning
with defaults.
Ex. obligations patterns
2.1 Fraassen ©p,©¬p AND, WC
2.2 Forrester ©(¬k|Û),©(g|k),ã g → k FD, (R)AND
2.3 Forrester ©(¬k|Û),©(g|k),ã g → k (R)SA, ANDC, WC
2.6 Cottage ©(¬f |Û),©(w ∧ f |f),©(f |d) RSAo
2.7 Jeffrey ©(d|w),©(d|¬w),©(¬d|d↔ w) RSA, ORA
2.8 Chisholm ©(a|Û),©(t|a),©(¬t|¬a),¬a AND, FD, DD
2.9 Chisholm ©(a|Û),©(t|a),©(¬t|¬a),¬a T/ CT / ACT, ANDC
2.10 Möbius ©(¬a|c),©(c|b),©(b|a), a T/ CT
2.14 Priority 3©(¬b|a), 2©(b|Û), 1©(a|Û) T/ CT
Table 2: Summary of the examples
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Maybe the most important technical innovation of our formal framework is the conven-
tion of writing an argument for α supported by A as a pair (A,α) with (A,α) ∈ ©(N),
which means the same as α ∈ ©(N,A). We can move between ©(N) and ©(N,A) as
we move between ã and Cn in classical logic.
The ten properties of our formal framework listed in Table 3. We believe that all deontic
logics have to satisfy the deontic properties of factual detachment and violation detection,
and the logical properties of substitution, replacement by logical equivalents, implication
and paraconsistency. Moreover, we discussed the optional properties of aggregation, factual
and norm monotony, and norm induction.
FD (α, β) ∈ N ⇒ β ∈ ©(N,α) Factual detachment
VD (A, β)⇒ (A ∪ {¬β}, β) Violation detection
SUB α ∈ ©(N,A)⇒ α[σ] ∈ ©(N [σ], A[σ]) Substitution
RLE N ≈M,Cn(A) = Cn(B), Cn(α) = Cn(β), Replacement of
(A,α) ∈ ©(N)⇒ (B, β) ∈ ©(M) equivalents
IMP ©(N,A) ⊆ Cn(m(N) ∪A) Implication
PC α ∈ V (N,A)⇒ ∃M ⊆ N : α ∈ ©(M,A) Paraconsistency
and©(M,A) ∪A consistent
AND (A,α)(A, β)⇒ (A,α ∧ β) Conjunction
FM (A,α)⇒ (A ∪B,α) Factual monotony
NM ©(N) ⊆ ©(N ∪M) Norm monotony
NI M ⊆ O(N)⇒ O(N) = O(N ∪M) Norm induction
Table 3: Properties
There are two ways to look at the operator ©. First, given a set of norms, it derives
sentences from sentences: α ∈ ©N (A). This is the classical way deontic logics considered
normative systems: facts go in, obligations go out. Secondly, it derives arguments from
norms: (A,α) ∈ ©(N). These two views can be used to summarise our properties as
follows.
First, the operator in (A,α) ∈ ©(N) must be a closure operator, which means that
it satisfies factual detachment, norm monotony and norm induction. In addition, it must
satisfy substitution and replacement of logical equivalents. Secondly, the operator in α ∈
©N (A) must satisfy violation detection, implication, paraconsistency, factual monotony,
and aggregation.
The properties of norm monotony and norm induction have the effect that our logics will
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behave classically as Tarskian consequence operators. However, it is important to realise
that the closure properties on ©(N) are not as innocent as they are in other branches of
philosophical logic. In particular norm induction is very strong, because it says that every
argument (A,α) can itself be used as a norm. This may be true of some branches of case
law, but it is probably too strong to be accepted as a universal law for norms. We therefore
expect that future studies will first relax this requirement, before relaxing the others.
Finally, we may consider our ten properties as requirements for the further development
of reasoning methods for normative systems and deontic logic. We have recently presented
two logics satisfying all ten properties [19], which shows that the ten properties are consis-
tent in the sense that they can be satisfied simultaneously.
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